



Automotive Security | Standardization activities and attacking trend


Ingo Dassow, Deloitte

Automotive Risk Overview

Trends and risks for connected vehicles

Value and Components of a Car

Autonomous driving and shared mobility will leverage a change of the value of the car with an increasing number of market players



Challenges of automated vehicles

...pose new tasks to address in the future



Automotive Cyber Security

Available and upcoming standards

Standards Overview

Many of the established standards cross industrial boundaries and can be used for automotive security. A globally aligned standard for vehicle security is still missing.

International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC)

- ISO/IEC 9797-1: Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
- ISO/IEC 11889: Trusted Platform Module
- ISO 12207: Systems and software engineering – Software lifecycle processes
- ISO 15408: Evaluation criteria for IT security
- ISO 26262: Functional Safety for road vehicles
- ISO 27001: Information Security Management System
- ISO 27002: Code of Practice – Security
- ISO 27010: Information security management for inter-sector and inter-organizational communications
- ISO 27018: Code of Practice – Handling PII / SPI (Privacy)
- ISO 27034: Application Security
- ISO 27035: Information security incident management
- ISO 29101: Privacy architecture framework
- ISO 29119: Software testing standard
- IEC 62443: Industrial Network and System Security

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

- NIST SP800-30: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments
- NIST SP800-50: Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program
- NIST SP800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
- NIST SP800-64: Security Considerations in the System Development Lifecycle
- NIST SP800-121: Guide to Bluetooth Security
- NIST SP800-127: Guide to Securing WiMAX Wireless Communications
- NIST SP800-137: Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations
- NIST SP800-150: Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing




Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)

- SAE J2945: Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) Minimum Performance Requirements
- SAE J3061: Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems
- SAE J3101: Requirements for Hardware-Protected Security for Ground Vehicle Applications

Addressing Automotive Security throughout the whole vehicle lifecycle

Standards are needed to support the implementation of a risk based approach in each phase of the lifecycle.




ISO/IEC WD 21434

The upcoming standard from ISO and SAE for cybersecurity engineering

Goals

- Give uniform definition of notions relevant to automotive security
- Specify minimum requirements on security engineering process and activities
- Define criteria for assessment (wherever possible)
- Describe the state of the art of security engineering in automotive E/E development
- Provide a common and internationally agreed understanding of automotive cybersecurity engineering
- Can serve as reference for legislative institutions; ensure legal certainty


Security in the Product Life Cycle



Scope


- Requirements for cybersecurity risk management for road vehicles, their components and interfaces, throughout engineering (e.g. concept, design, development), production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning
- Framework for a cybersecurity process and a common language for communicating and managing cybersecurity risk among stakeholders
- Is applicable to road vehicles that include electrical and electronic (E/E) systems, their interfaces and their communications
- Not prescribe specific technology or solutions related to cybersecurity.

Project Groups



ISO/SAE 21434

Overall schedule from start on the 1st October 2016 until the publication on the 1st October 2019



First Achievements

- Security Level (CAL)
 - Inspired by EAL (CC)
 - Risk Profiles
- Production and Operation
 - Security in Manufacturing
 - Development of Software Updates
- Distributed Development
 - Data-Exchange between customer and supplier in different engineering phases
 - Clarifying Responsibilities
- Incident Management
 - Field Monitoring
 - Incident Mitigation
- Integration of Safety and Security
 - Identification of touch points
 - Harmonization between both processes
 - Considered in Risk Management
- Privacy
 - Considered in the Risk Management to be protected by Cybersecurity
 - No legal prescriptions (not a regulation)

WD: Working Draft; CD: Committee Draft; DIS: Draft International Standard

Automotive Risk Methodology

General Risk Evaluation Approach

Deloitte Automotive Cyber Security (ACS) services

to address the industry challenges based on our insights from different OEMs

ACS Security Architecture
Gap-Analysis to find strategy and roadmap for holistic security implementation.

Protective Measures **Detective Measures**

**Secured communication
InVehicle IDPS**

ACS Management System
Risk based Approach for managing Automotive Cyber Security throughout the whole vehicle lifecycle.

ACS Managed Services
Supporting services that should be built OEM and Tier1 independent

Advanced Threat Intelligence **Fleet SIEM**

Incident Response

ACS Pentesting
Security checks by penetration testing on different applications, systems and components to support the security improvement process, using most current hacking techniques.



ACS Development Lifecycle
Integration of security activities throughout the development lifecycle enables timely and risk-based identification, as well as remediation of security vulnerabilities.

Leading questions in automotive risk methodology


As a basis for the vehicle risk evaluation approach, fundamental definitions and assumptions of risk management can be applied

Cyber Attack¹

“An **attack, via cyberspace**, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the **purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling** a **computing environment / infrastructure**; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled information.”

Questions

- **What kind of attack schemes are relevant in the context of vehicles?**
- **What are the critical infrastructure components and functions in vehicles?**
- **What is the intention of attackers / the purpose of an attack in the context of vehicles?**




Risk²

“The level of **impact** on organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a **threat** and the **ease of exploitation** of that threat occurring.”

Questions

- **What is the impact of a successful attack in terms of the critical infrastructure components and functions in vehicles?**
- **What are relevant threats in the vehicle environment?**
- **What is the ease of exploitation of attacks in the context of vehicles, considering existing vulnerabilities?**




¹ Source: CNSSI-4009 / National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Glossary of Key Information Security Terms 2013 2nd Revision

² Source: SP 800-60 / National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Glossary of Key Information Security Terms 2013 2nd Revision

Overview on Automotive Risk Methodology


The risk evaluation approach is based on the ease of exploitation and attack impact, both drilled down to meaningful criteria in the automotive environment

The Deloitte approach for an efficient automotive risk assessment is based on the popular and established CVSS and TARA methodology. The combination of a generic and expandable approach (CVSS) with a established approach (TARA) within the automotive industry and our long-standing practical experience ensure an efficient and target-oriented risk methodology.



Key Assumptions

- The overall risk matrix is a product of attack impact and ease of exploitation
- The ease of exploitations a product of component vulnerabilities and threats
- Risk scores for components are a result of the risk scores for the functions related to them
- Function threat is resulting from the highest attacker threat score
- Several attackers might be interested in a function
- Different attackers might have deviating motivation to get control over a function
- Vehicles consist of several components
- Components provide several functions
- Functions contains data interfaces that present possible attack vectors and needs special attention




Example testing steps for a component vulnerability (1/3)



Circuit level assessment

- 01 ○ Identifying electronic parts used by the component (e.g. MCU/CPU, flash/EEPROM, memory, interface drivers, etc.)
- 02 ○ Identifying on-board target interfaces (e.g. JTAG, UART, I2C, etc.)
- 03 ○ Extracting firmware (e.g. by debugging, flash reading, firmware update, etc.)
- 04 ○ Investigating the component design from security perspective
- 05 ○ Security features of sub components
 - Secure / authenticated boot
 - Debug interfaces
 - Location and method of data/code storage
- 06 ○ Security of signal routing
- 07 ○ Security of MCU/CPU interfaces

Example Physical entry points



Example wireless entry points



Source: <https://www.parallax.com/product/32115>

Example testing steps for a component vulnerability (2/3)

Firmware level assessment

Investigating and reverse engineering the firmware, time limited analysis

01 ○

Booting

- authentication / encryption
- programming errors in boot flow

02 ○

Software update

- delivery and protection of update image
- checking authenticity / encryption
- programing errors in checking / flashing flow

03 ○


Main software / firmware

- communication handling
- authentication / encryption
- use of known vulnerable software components
- data storing / handling / user files and input



04 ○

Preparing and executing Proof-of-Concept attacks against the revealed weaknesses

Example Physical entry points



Example wireless entry points



IDA Pro for reverse engineering

Example testing steps for a component vulnerability (2/3)

Interface level assessment

01 Identifying the communication channels of a component (e.g. CAN, OABR)

02 Capturing and analyzing of communication started by or targeting the component during various operation modes


- standard operation (vehicle off, ACC on, engine running, in motion)
- flashing
- coding
- diagnostic

03 Correlating data with specification information (received from OEM or downloaded from internet)



Finding weaknesses

- message manipulation via MitM
- secure access and authentication spoofing / bypassing,
- triggering functions via replaying

Example Physical entry points



Example wireless entry points



Automotive Cyber Security integration in the V-Model

Security modules are aligned with the development methodology to harmonize all activities and quality gates

